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Celebrating the "Null" Finding: Evidence-Based
Strategies for Improving Access to Legal Services
ABSTRACT. Recent empirical studies tested whether litigants with access to lawyers fared
better than litigants with access only to advice or limited assistance. Two of the three studies
produced null findings - the litigants with access to lawyers, the treatment group, fared no better
than litigants without a lawyer. In this Essay, I propose that we celebrate these null findings. I do
not doubt that expert lawyer assistance will be necessary in some, perhaps many, cases, but we
should reduce procedural and other complexities wherever possible in order to facilitate
self-help. We should measure improved access to legal services by the extent to which
self-empowered consumers are able to resolve everyday legal problems on their own or with
limited assistance. The flowering of "lawyer-lite" service innovations -services often preferred
by consumers- suggests that the practical work of building consumer-centered and consumer-
driven legal services delivery is not only possible, it is already underway.
A U T H 0 R. Senior Lecturer on Law and Director, Bellow-Sacks Access to Civil Legal Services
Project, Harvard Law School. A preliminary version of this Essay was presented at the 9th Legal
Services Research Centre International Legal Services Research Conference, Magdalen College,
Oxford University, September 12-14, 2012. This Essay is dedicated to Clinton Bamberger-a
mentor, colleague, and friend who, as its first president, made substantive justice the goal of the
Office of Economic Opportunity Legal.Services Program and throughout his career in public
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INTRODUCTION
Half a century ago, the Supreme Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright' that
an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to counsel at state
expense. No similar categorical right exists for a civil litigant, no matter how
consequential the stakes. Among the wealthy market democracies, the United
States is the only nation that does not guarantee access to a lawyer in civil
matters. What explains our nation's outlier status? Should achieving a civil
Gideon be the main policy goal of the access-to-justice movement in the United
States? What is the current policy agenda of peer nations that have had an
entitlement to counsel for decades?
In Part I, I describe how the origins of civil legal aid in the racial-justice and
antipoverty struggles of the 196os shaped early law-reform and systemic-
change goals. When a conservative backlash threatened the existence of
federally funded legal services, defenders of the program shifted to an access-
to-justice rationale that produced many changes in the legal services landscape
and, eventually, a civil Gideon movement. In Part II, I critically examine the
civil Gideon idea in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence, empirical research
findings, and the experience of peer nations. In Part III, I argue that civil
Gideon is not an adequate policy response to unequal access to the legal system
and propose continued reforms to enable self-help and "lawyer-lite" services. I
also suggest that greatly expanded access to law and its remedies is best
understood not as a normative issue, but as a public policy problem that will
yield to the tools of public policy analysis and research.
I. LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM LAW REFORM TO
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The founders of government-funded civil legal services in the United States
were not interested in a right to counsel. They intentionally shaped the
program to achieve substantive antipoverty goals rather than access goals. Over
time, this policy choice produced fierce conservative opposition that led legal
services advocates to reframe their movement in terms of access to justice.
With federal funding stagnant and the civil Gideon movement producing few
successes, courts and legal aid offices had to find ways to meet the needs of
growing numbers of unrepresented claimants. They developed new service
approaches that, of necessity, depended less on conventional, lawyer-centered
representation. Over time these innovations produced a more complex legal
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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services landscape in which self-help and other lawyer-lite services have
become commonplace.
A. Legal Services, Law Reform, and Controversy: 1965 to 198o
In 1965, two years after the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright,
government-funded legal services were established in the United States as part
of the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty.' The culture in the 196os
supported an overtly political agenda for "a new breed of lawyers . . . dedicated
to using the law as an instrument of orderly and constructive social change."'
Washington leadership made law reform and test cases the strategic priority
for the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) legal services lawyers, and it
evaluated grantees based on the law-reform cases they pursued.' The first
President of OEO Legal Services, Clinton Bamberger, announced to a national
meeting of state bar presidents that the goal of the program was to "contribute
to the War on Poverty" and "to marshal the forces of law and the strength of
lawyers to combat the causes and effect of poverty."s Ultimately, the goal of
the program was to "remodel the system which generates the cycle of poverty
and design new social, legal and political tools and vehicles to move poor
people from deprivation, depression and despair to opportunity, hope and
ambition.",6
This policy choice faced strong opposition from leaders of the solo and
small-firm bar who supported the English model of reimbursing private
attorneys for services provided to eligible clients. This approach later came to
be known as "judicare" for its similarity to the structure of the Medicare
program in the United States.7 The policymakers at OEO explicitly rejected the
2. EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM 39-49 (1974).
3. Alan Houseman & Linda Perle, Securing Equal Justice for All: A Brief History of Civil Legal
Assistance in the United States, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POL'Y 5, http://www.clasp.org/admin
/site/publications/files/oi58.pdf (quoting Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Att'y Gen., Speech to
U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare Conference (June 1964)).
4. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 132-33.
s. Id. at 120 (quoting Clinton Bamberger, Speech to the Nat'1 Conference of Bar Presidents
(Feb. 8, 1966)).
6. Id. (quoting Bamberger's speech).
7. Jeanne Charn, Foreword, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 3 n.12 (2013) (discussing the origins of
the term "judicare"); Alan Paterson, Financing Legal Services: A Comparative Perspective, in A
READER ON RESOURCING CIVIL JUSTICE 237, 239 (Alan Paterson & Tamara Goriely eds.,
1996).
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English model.8 In his speech to the state bar presidents, Bamberger went on
to comment:
I do not believe that an "English System" which parcels out the legal
problems of the poor to lawyers engaged not because they have a
singular dedication to assist poor people but because they are members
of a bar association . . . will ever provide the necessary concerted and
thoughtful legal analysis and challenge which must occur if the OEO
programs will be more than a chain of legal first-aid clinics. 9
OEO leaders wanted a service delivery model that would advance the law-
reform priority. They had no doubt that the optimal structure was full-time
poverty law experts working in not-for-profit legal services offices in the
neighborhoods where poor people lived. When the law-reform priority of OEO
legal services generated hostility from conservatives, Congress created a new
home for the program: the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). The change was
intended, in part, to insulate the program from controversy and political
influence.'o This strategy succeeded for a short time. By the end of the Carter
Administration in 1980, LSC was the main funder and national policy center of
civil legal services. The salaried-staff model was firmly in place, " and LSC had
programs in every state and territory. Congressional funding for legal services
was at its peak, a level not exceeded since 1980." That funding level supported
"minimum access," which was defined as two attorneys for every ten thousand
poor people.'"
This high point did not last long. The Reagan Administration ushered in a
concerted effort to abolish LSC. " Existential threats from conservative
opponents continued through the end of the Reagan Administration, abated
8. See Gary Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 337, 340 (1980).
9. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 119-20.
io. John Kilwein, The Decline of the Legal Services Corporation: 'It's Ideological, Stupid!', in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES 41, 48 (Francis
Regan et al. eds., 1999).
ii. Houseman & Perle, supra note 3, at 24-25. The LSC Act mandated a study to determine if a
judicare model could provide legal services effectively. The study, released in an intensely
politicized environment, found that no alternative model was superior to the staffed model
but that the judicare model could also be viable.
1. See id. at 38 (providing a table that depicts the change in LSC funding from 1980 to later
grant years, which takes into account the time value of a dollar).
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id. at 29-33.
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somewhat in the George H.W. Bush Administration, 'I and resumed in 1994
when Republicans gained control of the lo4th Congress. That Congress
enacted the most severe budget cuts and restrictions in the history of the
program. " The persistent and fierce opposition from conservatives was rooted
in their objection to the social-change and law-reform mission of legal services,
which they considered political activities.'" Many conservatives tolerated a
legal services program that helped people with their everyday legal problems,
but they vehemently opposed the class actions, legislative advocacy, and test
cases aimed at producing systemic change.' 8
Legal aid lawyers, with the unwavering support of the American Bar
Association, organized to save the program. They were ultimately successful,
but the price was slashed LSC funding, a prohibition on class actions, and
restrictions on the substantive claims and remedies that LSC lawyers could
pursue for their clients."9
B. The Civil Gideon Movement
The right-to-counsel movement, which had no traction in the first decades
of government-funded legal services, gained supporters due to growing
political opposition to the systemic-change goals of the early years. Legal-
services advocates and advocacy groups responded with increasing enthusiasm
to the "clarion call" of equal access to justice.2 o Organizing to support a right to
counsel in civil matters provided a new focus that was, as I have noted
is. Id. at 34-35.
16. Id. at 36-40.
7. See Hidden Agendas: What Is Really Behind Attacks on Legal Services Lawyers?, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUST. 2 (2001), http://brennan3cdn.net/bfeb6d6f6dooe 9 bb 57 _grm6ben2i.pdf;
Left Out in the Cold: How Clients Are Affected by Restrictions on Their Legal Services Lawyers,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. 6 (2000), http://brennan. 3 cdn.net/fd3 ic8d6l 9 df2eaa6b
_kvm6booo3.pdf; Restricting Legal Services: How Congress Left the Poor With Only Half a
Lawyer, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. 2 (2000), http://brennan.3cdn.net/3cbbeedd 5 2806 583 bi
osm6blo8g.pdf. For examples of conservative attacks on LSC, see WASH. LEGAL FOUND.,
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION: THE ROBBER BARONS OF THE POOR? (1985); and Kenneth F.
Boehm & Peter T. Flaherty, Why the Legal Services Corporation Must Be Abolished, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Oct. 18, 1995), http://thf media.s3.amazonaws.com/1995/pdf/bgio57.pdf.
18. See Earl Johnson, Jr., justice and Reform: A Quarter-Centuty Later, in THE TRANSFORMATION
OF LEGAL AID: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES, supra note io, at 9, 32-33; Houseman
& Perle, supra note 3, at 29-37.
ig. Kilwein, supra note lo, at 55-58; Houseman & Perle, supra note 3, at 36-39.
2o. Richard Moorhead & Pascoe Pleasence, Access to Justice After Universalism: Introduction, 30
J.L.& Soc'y1, 1 (2003).
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elsewhere, "widely viewed as apolitical, an entailment of the nation's
commitment to equality under law."21 A coalition of advocates and advocacy
groups organized the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel to
pursue legislative reform at the state level and litigate due process claims in
federal and state courts.2 ' The National Center for Access to Justice2 describes
itself as "the single academically affiliated nonpartisan law and policy
organization dedicated exclusively to assuring access to our civil and criminal
justice system." 2s Its small staff pursues a wide range of policy advocacy-
reports, articles, teaching, conferences-in pursuit of full access to the courts.
Neither of these organized efforts existed until the late 1990s.
The civil Gideon rationale is familiar. The legal problems of everyday life
are pervasive and consequential. 26 The increasing importance of law in
people's daily lives results from courts and legislatures creating an array of
social-welfare entitlements and consumer and procedural protections that are
meaningful only if people can claim and enforce them. The ABA 27 and a
number of state bar associations28 have staked out policy positions in support
of a civil Gideon. The ABA supports a categorical right to counsel in areas of
"basic human need," defined as shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and child
21. Jeanne Charn, Legal Services for All: Is the Profession Ready?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1025
(2009).
22. See, e.g., Leadership, NAT'L COALITION FOR A CIviL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, http://www
.civilrighttocounsel.org/about the coalition/leadership (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
23. Id.; see also Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 245 (20o6) (surveying state law); Paul Marvy, Advocacy for a
Civil Right to Counsel: An Update, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 644 (2008) (updating the 20o6
survey).
24. Mission, NAT'L CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUST., http://ncforaj.org/about-2/mission (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013).
25. Approach, NAT'L CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUST. (Nov. 1, 2012), http://ncforaj.files.wordpress
.com/2012/11/Overview-of-ncaj-11-2-12.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Ab Currie, The Legal Problems ofEveryday Life, in 12 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: SOCIOLOGY
OF CRIME, LAWAND DEVIANCE 1, 1-2 (Rebecca L. Sandefur ed., 2009).
27. ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (2oo6), http://abanet.org/leadership
/2oo6/annual/onehundredtwelvea.doc [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
28. The ABA report has been co-sponsored by, among others, the New York City Bar
Association, King County Bar Association, New York County Lawyers' Association,
Philadelphia Bar Association, Washington State Bar Association, Boston Bar Association,
Colorado Bar Association, Los Angeles County Bar Association, and the Bar Association of
the District of Columbia. It is also supported by the Massachusetts Bar Association and,
with caveats, by the Chicago Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Foundation. See Bar
Resolutions, NAT'L COALITION FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, http://civilrighttocounsel.org
/resources/barresolutions (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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custody. The ABA resolution specifies that "[t]he above categories are
considered to involve interests so fundamental and important as to require
governments to supply low-income persons with effective access to justice as a
matter of right. There is a strong presumption this mandates provision of lawyers
in all such cases."'9 The right-to-counsel movement also encompasses less
expansive approaches, such as a right to counsel in specific circumstances or a
more complex, graduated approach that incorporates less lawyer-intensive
30services.
However powerful and elegant the rationale, and despite the support of
prestigious bar groups and well-regarded scholars, progress toward a civil
Gideon has been slow. The allure of a civil Gideon is dimmed by the prospect of
massive, open-ended costs and nagging doubts about the value that
representation by a lawyer adds in many routine matters." Although there
have been some state legislative successes in narrowly defined circumstances,"
the larger agenda is stalled.
Within the broader access-to-justice community, an alternative view
supports a policy that would create an entitlement not to a lawyer but to legal
assistance appropriate to a claimant's circumstances and need. Conventional,
expert attorney representation would be available, but only when evidence
showed that less intensive assistance could not be effective. In sharp contrast to
the strong Gideon position adopted by the ABA, this functionalist, pragmatic
approach envisions a civil legal services delivery system that: (1) privileges self-
help and similar "lawyer-less" and "lawyer-lite" services; (2) encourages
innovation in legal services delivery; and (3) requires a robust empirical
research program to comparatively assess different modes of assistance and to
gain in-depth understandings of consumer needs and preferences. 3
29. ABA REPORT, supra note 27, at 13 (emphasis added). The ABA resolution recognizes narrow
exceptions for "trivial" matters and the possibility that carefully structured "informal"
processes might be sufficient to assure a fair hearing in some instances. Id. at 13-14.
3o. For thoughtful advocacy of this approach, see Russell Engler, Towards a Context-Based Civil
Right to Counsel Through "Access to Justice" Initiatives, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 196 (20o6);
and Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the Courts in Delivering Access to
Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 31 (2013).
31. See Moorhead & Pleasence, supra note 20, at 2-3, 8.
32. Abel & Rettig, supra note 23.
33. Jeanne Charn & Richard Zorza, Civil Legal Services for All Americans, BELLOw-SACKs AcCEss
TO CIvuL LEGAL SERVS. PROJECT (2005), http://www.garybellow.org/Text.pdf.
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C. The New Legal Services Landscape
At the same time that the ABA and access-to-justice advocates were
fighting to save LSC, they were also pursuing alternatives. They successfully
cultivated new sources of funding, developed new modes of service delivery,
and brought powerful new stakeholders into the access-to-justice camp."
Viewed as a whole, these changes transformed civil legal services from a
Washington-based, LSC-centered, congressionally funded program to a
decentralized operation lacking a policy or management center and
predominantly funded by state and local sources. While the causes of this
dramatic transformation are complex, the changes are unmistakable and their
implications for expanded access in general, and the civil Gideon movement in
particular, are great.
A larger, more diverse resource base. In 1980, total funding for civil legal aid
was about $338 million, of which $300 million - nearly ninety percent - came
from LSC. Over the next three decades, funding changed dramatically, as set
out in Table 1.
Table 1.35
FUNDING FOR CIVIL LEGAL AID
LSC $ NON-L5C $ TOTAL$
1980 300 million 28 million 328 million
2009 390 million 910 million 1,300 million
This remarkable shift was a result of stagnant congressional appropriations
for LSC from 1980 to 2009. If Congress had done nothing other than adjust its
1980 appropriation for inflation, LSC's budget in 2009 would have been
$752,938,299, not the $390 million it received." As LSC's funding was
declining by half in real dollars, non-LSC funding increased twenty-four fold
over its 1980 level, more than making up for the loss of LSC funds. However,
34. Charn, supra note 21, at 1029-43; Charn & Zorza, supra note 33; Houseman & Perle, supra
note 3, at 41-46.
3s. Alan W. Houseman, National Report: The United States: Civil Legal Aid in the United States:
An Update for 2oo9, INT'L LEGAL AID GROUP 15 (2009), http://www.ilagnet.org/conf 2oo9
/reports/US%20-%2oAH.pdf.
36. Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Aid in the United States: An Update for 2011, INT'L LEGAL AID
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while total dollars increased, the funding base became more diverse and
decentralized, hindering efforts to deploy resources strategically and generating
growing disparities among states. To date, these problems have not been well
documented and have received little attention in policy discussions.
Service innovations flourish. Beginning in the 198os and accelerating in the
1990s, legal aid lawyers, state court judges and administrators, and the solo
and small-firm bar had to confront rapidly growing numbers of litigants
without lawyers. They responded with an explosion of innovation in self-help
and less-than-full-service assistance that increased consumer choice and
facilitated access. While the impetus for many of these innovations was to
provide a stopgap until traditional lawyer services could be expanded, court-
based self-help,37 unbundled legal services, hot lines, online services, and
similar "lawyer-lite" innovations have become permanent features of the new
legal services landscape."
State courts become stakeholders. The judges and court administrators who
led reforms that make courts more self-help friendly have became major
stakeholders and influential partners in national access-to-justice policy
making. The Self-Represented Litigation Network" (SRLN) is a coalition of
state access-to-justice organizations and state court judges, administrators, and
self-help center directors promoting self-help-friendly courts. SRLN does this
by conducting research and producing bench guides, best practices materials,
and curricula for training administrative staff, clerks, and judges.
The rise of institutionalized pro bono. Pro bono is not new, but what was once
a local, informal activity is now an institutionalized presence in legal services,
the bar, and the nation's law schools .4o The ABA has a Standing Committee on
Pro Bono and Public Service"1 and the Pro Bono Institute, founded in 1996
and supported by major law firms and corporate partners, is the institutional
37. Richard Zorza, The Self-Help Friendly Court: Designed from the Ground Up To Work for People
Without Lawyers, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTs. (2002), http://lri.1sc.gov/sites/default/files
/LRI/pdf/o3/o30m 1selfhelpct.pdf.
38. Charn, supra note 7; Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to
Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45 (2012),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/o7/3o/selbin-charn-alfieri&wizner.html.
39. SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION NETWORK, http://www.srln.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
40. In certain law schools, pro bono service is a J.D. requirement. New York State, in fact,
requires bar applicants to complete fifty hours of pro bono as a requirement of admission.
See Jonathan Lippman, New York's Template To Address the Crisis in Civil Legal Services, 7
HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 13 (2013).
41. Standing Committee on Pro Bono & Public Service, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org
/groups/probono-public service.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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center and leading authority on all aspects of pro bono services in the United
States.42 While we know very little about the output of pro bono hours
annually, the significance of pro bono has led astute commentators to claim,
plausibly, that in the United States, "legal services for poor and other
marginalized clients are provided through a hybrid public-private system built
on three pillars: governmental support, institutional philanthropy, and private
lawyer charity.... This tripartite relationship affects not just how much access
to justice exists, but what type and who gets it.""
This insight is on target, but the pillar metaphor may suggest more
structure and coordination than actually exists." Researchers at the American
Bar Foundation recently undertook the "first-ever state-by-state portrait of the
services available" in which they attempted to accurately and transparently
identify the location and order of magnitude of funds available for civil legal
services.4s The study found considerable diversity and creativity at the local
level, but fragmentation and inequality within and among states. Particularly
troubling is the study's finding that "geography is destiny: the services
available to people from eligible populations who face civil justice problems are
determined not by what their problems are or the kinds of services they may
need, but rather by where they happen to live."46 This unfortunate situation
results from the fact that "[1]ittle coordination exists for civil legal assistance,
and existing mechanisms of coordination often have powers only of
exhortation and consultation."47
Crucial decisions about service and case-taking priorities (who gets legal
help and who does not), types of services offered (referral, information, advice,
representation), and expectations about productivity (efficiency and cost-
effectiveness) are typically made by local legal services programs. The result is:
growing resource disparities among states,48 no capacity to scale up promising
42. About Us, PRO BONO INST., http://www.probonoinst.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 31,
2013).
43. Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We Know-and Should
Know-About American Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. &POL'Y REv. 83,83 (2013).
44. See Laura Abel, Designing Access: Using Institutional Design To Improve Decisionmaking About
the Distribution ofFree Civil Legal Aid, 7 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv 61 (2013).
45. Rebecca L. Sandefur & Aaron C. Smyth, Access Across America: First Report of the Civil





48. Houseman, supra note 35, at 12.
2216
122:22o 6 2013
CELEBRATING THE "NULL" FINDING
innovations, a lack of consumer knowledge about service options, and
inadequate data to gauge provider quality and productivity." The
fragmentation of funding and services has also generated daunting challenges
of coordination and management and exposed the dearth of knowledge about
the operations and outcomes of the much more complex civil legal services
landscape that exists today. It is against this background that policies aimed at
greatly expanding access to civil legal advice and assistance must be critically
assessed.
II. THE LIMITS OF THE CIVIL GIDEON MOVEMENT
In this section, I examine the right-to-civil-counsel movement from three
perspectives, each of which exposes practical as well as conceptual problems. I
begin in Section II.A with the June 2011 decision of the Supreme Court in
Turner v. Rogers,so the first civil right-to-counsel case to reach the Court in
thirty years. I then consider in Section II.B the implications of empirical
research findings that challenge fundamental premises underlying civil Gideon.
In Section II.C., I turn to the experience of the English legal aid system that has
had a civil right to counsel for sixty years but is now pursuing policies that
increase advice and other modes of informal and less lawyer-centric services.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The prospect of the Supreme Court recognizing a categorical right to
counsel in civil cases is remote. In 1981, the Supreme Court found no right to
counsel for an indigent mother facing termination of her parental rights.s"
Thirty years later, in Turner, the Court had another opportunity to address the
issue of a civil right to counsel. Again, the Court found no categorical right, all
but closing the door on prospects for a strong constitutional civil Gideon.
However, the Turner majority did find the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of due process both relevant and actionable.
The crux of Turner was whether a low-income father, facing jail in a civil
contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support, was entitled to the
appointment of counsel at state expense. Under the law of South Carolina,
49. See WAYNE MOORE, DELIVERING LEGAL SERVICES TO Low-INCOME PEOPLE (2011). Moore
worked for years at AARP Legal Counsel for the Elderly and is an expert on legal services
delivery systems.
50. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
51. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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where the case arose, the father's inability to pay was a defense to civil
contempt. Because risk of incarceration has been a deciding factor in criminal
and juvenile right-to-counsel cases, Turner's counsel believed they had a
strong claim. Their confidence was bolstered by the fact that a substantial
majority of the circuits and state courts of last resort that had addressed this
issue had found a right to counsel.s2 The Supreme Court held that the
defendant's due process rights had been violated, but a unanimous court
refused to find a categorical right to counsel. Instead, the five-Justice majority
held that the due process rights of the defendant could have been protected by
"substitute procedural safeguards" that would have ensured "a fundamentally
fair determination" of the important issues in the case.s1 While not mandating
particular safeguards, the Court offered the following as examples that would
have met due process requirements:
(1) notice to the defendant that his "ability to pay" is a critical issue in
the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to
elicit relevant financial information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing
for the defendant to respond to statements and questions about his
financial status (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the form); and
(4) an express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to
pay. s
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, identified a number of practical
considerations that influenced the Court's decision to look to procedural
safeguards in lieu of requiring counsel. I see in the Court's reasoning at least
four salient considerations.
First, the crucial issue in the case, Turner's ability to pay, involved
straightforward factual issues and no technical issues of law.s A debtor aware
of this should have been able to represent himself. Ironically, if the trial court
had appointed counsel, Turner's ability to pay would have been established
prior to meeting his lawyer, when he completed the typical form required to
52. See Price v. Turner, 691 S.E.2d 470, 472 n.2 (2010) (compiling cases on point and finding
that twenty courts addressed the right-to-counsel issue in the context of civil contempt; four
federal appeals courts, one federal district court, and eleven state courts of last resort found a
right to appointed counsel). While the case was pending in the lower courts, Rebecca Price
changed her name to Rebecca Rogers.
53. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2511-12.
54. Id. at 2519.
55. Id. at 2519.
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determine that he was indigent.s
Second, the Court was loath to create an asymmetry of representation.
Turner's opponent was not the state but the mother of his children, and she
was also poor and unrepresented. Appointment of counsel only for Turner but
not for Rogers might have made the proceeding less, not more, fair and
increased the risk of an erroneous result.7
Third, not only was Rogers poor and without counsel, but, as the custodial
parent, she sought support for the parties' children. The Court noted that the
needs of such families played an "important role" in its analysis. The concern
of the majority was that introducing an attorney for the defaulting parent could
result in formality or delay that "would unduly slow payment to those
immediately in need."s" As scholars involved in the case have pointed out,
decades earlier the Court "had noted Judge Friendly's wise caution about
lawyers' costs: 'Within the limits of professional propriety, causing delay and
sowing confusion not only are [the lawyer's] right but may be his duty.'" 5
The Court may have been concerned that a lawyer for Turner might, by delay
or formality, wear down the unrepresented Ms. Rogers and so defeat
substantive justice with the result that poor children would suffer.
Fourth, in light of the above factors and the availability of substitute
procedural safeguards, the Court was reluctant to require states "to provide
indigents with counsel in every proceeding of the kind before US.",o Many
thousands of child-support arrears matters come before state courts every day,
in every jurisdiction. Perhaps with this in mind, the Court was unwilling to
find a categorical right to counsel that would have imposed a substantial
unfunded mandate on the state courts.
The Court's decision deeply disappointed civil Gideon advocates, 6  but
pragmatists read Turner as constitutionalizing court-based self-help and
celebrated the ruling. It is clear post-Turner that any state court without
explicit "procedural safeguards" in place for defendants in civil-contempt
hearings would be inviting due process challenges. The Self-Represented
s6. This irony was not lost on the Court. See id. at 2519-20.
57. Id.
s8. Id.
59. Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se
Access to Justice, 16o U. PA. L. REv. 967, 983 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Walters
v. Nat'1 Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985)). Bibas was counsel of record
for Rogers in the Supreme Court, and Barton submitted an amicus brief supporting Rogers.
6o. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518.
61. See The Turner Symposium, CONCURRING OPINIONs, http://www.concurringopinions.com
/archives/category/symposium-turner-v-rogers (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
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Litigation Network promptly set out to articulate guidance for achieving
compliance with Turner in nonsupport proceedings.62 As proponents of
increased assistance for self-helpers in lieu of a civil Gideon assert:
Properly handled, pro se court processes can be cheaper and fairer.
Extraordinarily, the Court noted that appointing counsel in pro se civil
cases could make the proceedings "less fair overall!" . . . . Though that
observation is a matter of common sense, the Court's prior case law had
consistently praised lawyers' role in guaranteeing just procedures.
Turner's changed tune reflects a more mature, more nuanced view of
lawyers and the complexity inherent in the adversarial system. If Turner
helps to spur new pro se court processes that are simpler and fairer,
everyone will benefit.
The Turner decision and the realist views expressed above expose some of
the practical and conceptual problems inherent in the civil Gideon idea.
B. Findings from Access-to-Justice Research
A bedrock assumption of the civil Gideon movement is that clients fare
substantially better when they are represented by able counsel. A corollary
belief is that the crisis in access to legal services is entirely a supply-side
problem. If providers had sufficient resources, low-income people would flock
to legal aid offices to get help. Empirical access-to-justice research challenges
both of these core understandings.
1. The Added Value ofLauyer Representation
Social-science researchers have undertaken a multi-year program of
random controlled trials testing whether lawyer services improve outcomes for
clients. This rigorous method provides the best evidence of the difference that
access to an attorney makes for legal outcomes. The results of the first three
random trials were circulated within months of the Turner decision, and this
coincidence magnified interest in both the study results and in the Turner case.
I leave aside issues of research design and method and report only the bottom-
line results of the studies and comment on their implications for efforts to
expand access to legal services.
62. See Richard Zorza, A New Day for Judges and the Self-Represented: The Implications of Turner
v. Rogers, JUDGES' J., Fall 2011, at 16.
63. Barton & Bibas, supra note 59, at 971 (footnote omitted).
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Unemployment insurance (UI) claimants. The first study involved applicants
for unemployment insurance appealing the denial of their application or
defending preliminary approval against an employer challenge.6 * The study
found that access to representation did not correlate with favorable outcomes.
However, representation did lengthen the time it took to reach a resolution and
thus delayed successful claimants' receipt of benefits by an average of two
weeks. The study's sample size was not large enough to investigate whether
traits of claimants (age, language ability, education level) or case characteristics
(length of employment, strength or novelty of claim, complexity of proof)
might correlate with a greater (or lesser) need for lawyer assistance, but further
trials could shed light on these important issues.
Tenants defending eviction. The results of the second and third studies were
circulated several months after the Turner decision. One study involved legal
aid lawyers representing tenants in a Massachusetts district court,"s and the
other study involved legal aid lawyers representing tenants in a county housing
court.6 6 In the housing court study, access to lawyer assistance had no effect
on outcomes.'6 In the district court study, however, tenants with access to
lawyer assistance fared substantially better than those who were randomly
assigned to information and self-help.6 Different legal aid programs provided
representation in the district court and housing court, but the study was not
designed to explore differences in approach to eviction defense or in quality of
representation, though such crucial issues could, and should, be accounted for
in further studies.
Implications for the right to counsel. At a minimum, the results of the studies
challenge the bar's deeply held belief that lawyers always add value. Reaction
to the UI study in the access-to-justice community was intense and often
negative.69 A Concurring Opinions online symposium discussing the study's
64. D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance:
What Diference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012).
65. D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Philip Hennessy, The Limits of
Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects
for the Future, 126 HARv. L. REV. 901 (2013).
66. D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, How Effective Are
Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Randomized Experiment in a Massachusetts Housing
Court (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880078.
67. Id.
68. Greiner et al., supra note 65-
6g. Selbin et al., supra note 38, at 48-51 (discussing the negative response to the UI study).
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implications for access to justice included research enthusiasts and skeptics. 7o
However, regardless of the early reactions to the three unprecedented studies,
the research does provide some rigorous evidence that self-representation can
be successful, at least in some settings, some of the time. Thus, the studies
undercut the civil Gideon premise that attorneys are essential to good
outcomes. The substantial advantage for represented tenants documented in
the district court study suggests, on the other hand, that empirical evidence can
also support a right-to-counsel claim. Further studies would test the strength
of these results and confirm or cloud these early findings. A larger sample size
would permit evaluation of subgroups to see if certain characteristics of clients
or of claims impact outcomes. More detailed information of this sort would aid
in targeting resources where they would have the most impact.
The results of these preliminary studies should be read with caution,
however. For example, UI hearing agencies may function differently in other
states or regions.7 ' Fortunately, the choice for legal services policymakers is not
binary: to provide or withdraw counsel where it "doesn't make a difference." In
the new legal services landscape, intermediate choices are available. Many
jurisdictions allow limited appearances by attorneys; one recognizes certified
legal technicians; 7 pro bono "lawyers of the day" may be available to give brief
advice (which would have benefited Michael Turner); and online advice and
assistance are increasingly available, as are much lower cost virtual law
practices. Possible sources and modes of assistance are rapidly expanding.
What is lacking is, first, the empirical evidence that would support confident
advice to claimants about what assistance would best meet their needs, and
second, the coordination and planning that would assure that the right
assistance is readily available to those who need it.7 1
70. Symposium: What Diference Representation, CONCURRING OPINIONS, http://www
.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/representation-symposium (last visited Mar. 31,
2013) (collecting about twenty reactions to the UI study by various authors).
pi. Enrique S. Pumar & Faith Mullen, The Plural ofAnecdote Is Not Data: Teaching Law Students
Basic Survey Methodology To Improve Access to Justice in Unemployment Insurance Appeals, 16
UDC/DCSL L. REv. 17, 42 (2012) (finding a "substantial need" for pro bono legal assistance
at UI hearings).
72. The Washington Supreme Court adopted a rule, effective September 2012, establishing
Limited Licensed Legal Technicians (LLLTs). WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28. The
LLLTs are authorized to assist parties in types of cases to be specified by the LLLT Board.
Id.
73. Abel, supra note 44.
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2. Understanding the Consumer Perspective
The conventional wisdom that cost is the main barrier to people seeking
legal representation 4 is challenged by over a decade of survey research that
explores how potential consumers of legal services respond to "justiciable
events" -meaning problems that have "legal aspects, legal consequences, and
(potentially) legal solutions" but "may never be understood or treated as a legal
problem."7 s Evidence is accumulating that justiciable problems are both
consequential and prevalent, but not often taken to lawyers."
Rebecca Sandefur has compared the findings of the English and Welsh
Civil and Social Justice Survey' with the findings of a similar national survey
in the United States.' Focusing on housing and personal financial problems,
she found that in both countries, people confirmed the widespread existence of
justiciable problems. Further, they reported that most problems were never
taken to lawyers and that cost was not the main barrier to seeking legal help. "
However, Americans behaved quite differently than their English
counterparts in important respects. One in four Americans "lumped" their
problems, meaning they did nothing.so Many of those who did take action
went to a lawyer."' In the United Kingdom, only five percent did nothing."
Of those who took action, ten percent sought legal advice while thirty-seven
percent (nearly four times as many) sought advice from informal "institutions
74. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming. . ., 15 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 631 (1981)
(positing that a multistage process results in only a small fraction of potential claims ever
reaching a lawyer or a legal institution).
75. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal
Institutions ofRemedy, 42 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 949, 951 n.5 (2009) (citing HAzEL GENN ET AL.,
WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING To LAW 12 (1999)).
76. Herbert M. Kritzer, To Lawyer or Not To Lawyer: Is that the Question?, 5 J. EMPIIUCAL LEGAL
STUD. 875, 896 fig.12, 897 fig.13, 898 fig.14 (2008) (reviewing legal-needs studies conducted
in Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United States, England, and
Wales).
T7. PASCOE PLEASENCE, CAUSES OF ACTION: CIVIL LAW AND SOCIALJUSTICE (2d ed. 2006).
78. Consortium on Legal Needs & the Pub., Legal Needs and Civil justice: A Survey
ofAmericans, A.B.A. (1994), http://www.americanbar.org/contentdam/aba/migrated/legal
services/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.authcheckdam.pdf.
79. Sandefur, supra note 75, at 952-53.
So. Id. at 970.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 971.
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of remedy," such as the Citizens Advice Bureau or local councils, 8 3 even though
they were entitled to consult a solicitor. The research also shows that everyday
problems cluster and compound and that people report negative consequences
from the strain of nagging, unresolved civil-justice problems. 84
The stunning lesson from this now-substantial body of research is this: if
we want to increase access to legal services, we cannot think only about more
lawyers. The United Kingdom continues to guarantee access to lawyers,8 ' but
policymakers have made a major commitment to advice services because when
"a delivery system offers consumers many choices in addition to . . . lawyer
services, consumers are both more likely to seek help . . . and less likely to seek
lawyer services."8 That is, when people have a choice between lawyers and
readily available, informal advice-givers, we have a lot of evidence that many
prefer the informal advisors to lawyers, at least in the first instance. Advice
services reach people who would not go to a law office and may reach them
when limited assistance can avert the need for more intensive, expert, and
costly intervention.
C. Lessons from the English Experience
As noted in Part I, the policy choices of the founders of the English legal aid
system differed from policy choices made in the United States. The Legal
Advice and Assistance Act of 1949 guarantees counsel, at public expense, in a
wide array of cases. " People who need legal aid go to a solicitor of their choice,
and if court proceedings are needed, the solicitor provides the service and bills
the government.88 Low-income people pay nothing, but higher-income people
are required to contribute to the cost of assistance.
83. Id.
84. Currie, supra note 26; Pascoe Pleasence et al., Mounting Problems: Further Evidence of the
Social, Economic and Health Consequences of Civil Justice Problems, in TRANSFORMING LIVES:
LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 67 (Pascoe Pleasence, Alexy Buck & Nigel J. Balmer eds., 2007);
Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses of
Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS, supra, at 112.
85. See infra Section II.C.
86. Charn, supra note 21, at 1054.
87. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 13 Geo. 6, c. 51 (1949) (U.K.). The 1949 Act was rewritten and its
provisions consolidated in the Legal Aid Act, 1974, c. 4 (U.K.). See The History ofLegal Aid,
SAVE LEGAL AID, http://www.savelegalaid.co.uk/history.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
88. The solicitor gets prior approval from legal aid authorities to provide service. See Russell
Wallman, Legal Services in England, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: TIME FOR REFORM
194, 195 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990).
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The English system was and is generous, and therefore it is expensive.
Eligibility limits are much higher than in the United States, and every eligible
person who requests help gets it. Legal Aid is popular with the public, despite
the high price, and no political party has advocated abolishing the program.
Crises in legal services in England arise due to rising costs.5 9 Cost-control
efforts have led to lowering of eligibility from eighty percent of the population
in 1949 to less than fifty percent by 2009.9o However, the English system
continues to be widely available. 91 The contrast with legal aid in the United
States is stark. Legal aid in the states serves only the very poor, the fee-for-
service bar plays a negligible role, budgets are capped, and most people who
request help are turned away due to lack of resources.
While the guarantee of access to a solicitor remains a mainstay of legal aid
in the United Kingdom, significant additions have been introduced over the
past two decades. Based on the justiciable-problem research described in
Section II.B, 92 legal aid policymakers have substantially expanded informal
advice services, 93 thereby reducing the number of people who take no action
when confronted with justiciable problems.9 ' Policymakers have also funded
staffed offices to supplement private bar delivery, instituted "duty solicitor"
roles for in-court limited assistance, and funded online and hotline information
and advice services. The most far-reaching reform may be legislation that
encourages market innovations and the expansion of market options by
permitting private capital investments in legal service businesses.9
8g. Tamara Goriely & Alan Paterson, Introduction: Resourcing Civil Justice, in A READER ON
RESOURCING CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 1, 1; Legal Action Group, The Current Position, in
AREADERON RESOURCING CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 264; Paterson, supra note 7, at 237.
go. Paterson, supra note 7, at 237 n.96. For a concise description of the reforms of the past two
decades and current eligibility criteria, see Legal Aid Since 2ooo, SAVE LEGAL AID,
http://www.savelegalaid.co.uk/legalaidbeforelaspo.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
91. At present, the eligible percentage of the English population is more than twice as large as
the eligible percentage of the U.S. population.
92. The Legal Services Research Centre, a component of the Legal Services Commission, has
pioneered empirical research on legal services delivery. Legal Services Research Centre,
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/lsrc (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
93. See Gary Bellow, Legal Services in Comparative Perspective, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
371, 375 (1994) (arguing for adoption in the United States of Canadian and European
models of front-end advice services).
94. PLEASENCE, supra note 77, at 129 (reporting a reduction from twenty percent to ten percent
in the number of people who took no action when confronted with a justiciable problem).
95. Vanessa Rakel, Paul Anderson & Jonathan Edwards, Tesco Law: The Big Bang in the UK
Legal Industry (2011) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Why Choose Us, Co-
OPERATIVE LEGAL SERVS., http://www.co-operative.coop/legalservices/why-choose-us (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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The bottom line is that English policymakers now advocate a diverse,
mixed-model delivery system that encourages self-help and offers less lawyer-
centric services. Legal aid in England and Wales has had a right to counsel for
more than fifty years, but policy makers have found that a diverse delivery
system is preferred by consumers, reaches more people, and plays a role in
constraining costs. Scotland, Ireland, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian
nations, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand-all countries with right-to-
counsel legal aid programs similar to the English model -are also developing
complex mixed-model delivery systems that emphasize readily available,
informal advice services. 6
The legal landscape that policymakers in England and Wales (and many
other countries) are pursuing has much in common with the complex, mixed-
model landscape that has emerged from the bottom up as a result of local
innovation and activism in the United States. From quite different starting
points, the paths of the United States's and other countries' legal aid programs
are converging around common policy goals and challenges.
III. TOWARD CONSUMER-CENTERED, EVIDENCE-BASED LEGAL
SERVICES
The discussion above has problematized the case for a broad, categorical
civil Gideon along the lines advocated in the ABA model resolution. Empirical
research has shown that many consumers prefer alternatives to lawyers and
that lawyers sometimes add cost, complexity, and delay without improving
results. Remarkably, the Supreme Court has acknowledged this plain reality
and held that the due process rights of parties who cannot afford a lawyer can
be secured by safeguards short of appointed counsel. Decades of experience
with court reforms that make it easier for parties to self-represent have
demonstrated that these approaches work well in some, perhaps many,
circumstances. Peer nations that have had an entitlement to lawyer assistance
for decades are investing heavily in informal advice services and reaching
people who would never have sought out lawyers.
More fundamentally, the right-to-counsel movement, rooted as it is in the
assumption that conventional attorney service is the optimal response to legal
needs, does not take account of what we have learned about the actual -not
96. See the International Legal Aid Group (ILAG) website for biannual conference papers that
report on developments in participating countries and share an impressive body of empirical
research on all aspects of legal services delivery issues; the complex, mixed-model approach
is evident. INT'L LEGALAID GROUP, http://www.ilagnet.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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assumed -preferences of consumers or the remarkable service variety that now
characterizes both subsidized and market-delivered legal services. Legal aid
offices and the solo and small-firm private bar have produced service
innovations that meet legal needs in new ways and that allow lawyers and
clients to work out a mix of advice, representation, and self-help. 9 The pace of
service innovation is accelerating, not abating, and it is inconceivable that it
will be turned back in favor of conventional, costly, start-to-finish lawyer
representation.
There are other reasons-both practical and conceptual-to be skeptical
about making civil Gideon the policy engine for substantially expanding access
to civil legal assistance.
A. Practical Problems with Civil Gideon
Practical problems, particularly those related to cost, pose the greatest
obstacle to right-to-counsel strategies. The commentary in the ABA resolution
suggests one-hundred dollars per eligible poor person as a back-of-the-
envelope figure for "full need," sixty dollars for a narrower guarantee, and a
bottom-line cost three to five times greater than present funding from all
sources.9' it is difficult to imagine any state or the federal government
committing to a new, open-ended entitlement at these levels, particularly when
it is likely that these estimates are far too low. A leading attorney and
economist, testifying at a hearing called by the Chief Judge of New York State,
pointed out that twenty-five million dollars would
buy 1 million low-income households about seven and a half minutes of
legal help at $200 an hour. Indeed, the entire budget for New York
state courts this year-$2.3 billion-would buy these 3 million low-
income people only seven and a half hours of attorney assistance with
each of their legal problems. 99
97. The ABA Standing Committee on Delivery of Legal Services promotes and disseminates
service innovations. Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_1egalservices.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2013). The ABA eLawyering Task Force supports and reports on cutting edge technology
centered services. Law Practice Management Section: eLawyering Task Force, A.B.A.,
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=EPo245oo (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
98. ABA REPORT, supra note 27, at 14.
g. Gillian K. Hadfield, Summary of Testimony: Task Force To Expand Civil Access to Legal
Services in New York (Oct. 1, 2012), http://sbmblog.typepad.com/files/hadfield-testimony
-october-2o12-final-2-1.pdf.
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In addition to these daunting figures, implementing a right to counsel will
generate upward cost pressures and other practical problems.
Escalating income eligibility. Eligibility for appointed counsel will escalate
because the income needed to hire a private attorney is much higher than 125%
of poverty, the limit for most LSC-funded assistance. If civil Gideon is limited
to the very poor, the asymmetry of representation noted in Turner will arise
whenever an eligible party is opposed by a near-poor, ineligible party. Either
eligibility levels must escalate to solve the asymmetry problem- thus
increasing costs-or dissatisfaction with the program due to perceived and
actual unfairness will erode support.
Court and crisis centered services. The case for civil Gideon is strongest where
people of limited means face crises that are both consequential and have legally
complex dimensions. However, prioritizing funding for crisis intervention in
complex legal cases is likely to draw resources into court and away from advice
and transactional assistance that might have prevented or ameliorated the crisis
in the first place. For example, assistance with debt problems may prevent a
foreclosure, but imminent foreclosure may be the point at which legal help
becomes available under civil Gideon. Thus, even a narrowly defined, well-
funded right to counsel for specific, legally complex matters would be an
inadequate policy. Additional resources will be needed for early intervention
services to prevent crises and to respond to the sea of legal problems of
everyday life that, while not necessarily complex, are consequential.'
Quality at risk. An ABA-type right to counsel that includes a strong
presumption in favor of lawyer services in most cases is likely to result in "a
Pyrrhic victory: lawyer-for-a-day programs that provide counsel in name
only."o. The formalism inherent in the civil Gideon concept is likely to lead to
formalistic compliance. If caseloads are too high, compensation too low, or
attorneys lack experience and training, quality will suffer. These problems
plague the public defender system"0 2 and are likely to present major practical
problems for a civil Gideon.
One size fits all. While a problem of "under-lawyering" will jeopardize
quality when an inexperienced or limited-assistance attorney is appointed on a
complex case, civil Gideon will also produce problems of "over-lawyering." If a
mandate requires lawyers to provide assistance that could be provided by
ioo. Ab Currie, The Legal Problems ofEveryday Life, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE 1 (Rebecca L. Sandefur
ed., 2009).
ioi. Barton & Bibas, supra note 59, at 994.
102. For a discussion of the problems with the quality of appointed counsel in criminal matters,
see Paul Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique ofRights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176 (2013);
and Justin F. Marceau, Gideon's Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482 (2013).
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information services, a self-help center, easy-to-use forms, or lay advisors, the
client will have been "over-served" because a high-cost resource will have been
used when a lower-cost alternative would function as well or better. Turner
recognizes this dilemma, and the Court's unmistakable imperative is to direct
the access-to-justice movement toward building ladders of assistance-from
information to limited advice to the appointment of a lawyer (of appropriate
experience) for part or all of a proceeding. In a post-Turner world, a volunteer
law student or pro bono lawyer of the day, appropriately situated in a larger
system, becomes an asset, not a symbol of nominal compliance but substantive
failure.o 3
B . Conceptual Problems with Civil Gideon
In addition to multiple practical problems, the right-to-counsel movement
rests on conceptions that do not hold up to empirical or critical scrutiny.
Legal needs are complex and not lawyer-centered. Civil Gideon proponents tend
to understand legal needs in lawyer-focused terms. As discussed in Part II, a
substantial body of survey research shows that, contrary to lawyers'
assumptions, lay people often prefer informal advice services even when
attorney assistance is available. A consumer-driven and responsive legal
services system requires that we institutionalize routine justiciable-problem
survey research to stay abreast of the preferences, needs, and perceptions of the
public. The research also suggests that informal advice services-far from
being a second-best alternative to lawyers1 o4 -are essential to reach people
who would not seek help from a law office.
Lawyers are not always the optimal response to legal needs. The ABA's proposed
"strong presumption" that lawyers should be the default option in a wide array
of cases'os does not take into account relevant factors such as the complexity,
strength, or novelty of the legal claims; the capacities and preferences of the
claimant; or the training, knowledge, and experience of the attorney. When
these factors are considered, it is not surprising that empirical research shows
that access to lawyers does not always add value. Rather than ask how we get
lawyers for everyone, we should ask how we can test our best judgments about
103. Charn & Zorza, supra note 33 (proposing a mixed-model delivery system with a "pyramid"
of services from information and self-help at the base to expert lawyer services at the apex).
104. Peter Edelman, When Second Best Is the Best We Can Do: Improving the Odds for Pro Se
Litigants, in CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, CLOSING THE JUSTICE GAP: How INNOVATION AND
EVIDENCE CAN BRING LEGAL SERVICES TO MORE AMERICANS 39 (June 2o1),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2oi/o6/pdf/prose-all.pdf.
ioS. ABA REPORT, supra note 27, at 13.
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when lawyers make a difference and about whether advice, limited assistance,
self-help, or some other approach is the best option to meet a particular need.
A legal services delivery system designed to respond to the latter question
would require routine data collection and analysis as well as rigorous
evaluation of different modes of legal assistance. It would require an
evidentiary basis for comparing the costs and benefits of different modes of
service.
Lawyers may be a poor choice to meet some important legal needs. Rebecca Aviel
makes a powerful case that adversarial lawyers are a poor choice for separated
or divorcing parents, particularly those resolving differences involving their
children. o6  Although care and custody of children is of paramount
importance-and so fits the significance prerequisite for civil Gideon-Aviel
cites empirical evidence that parents want proceedings that are "shorter,
simpler, cheaper, more personal, more collaborative and less adversarial," and
growing evidence that "a lawyer-centric adversary system . .. does more harm
than good for most domestic relations litigants."1 o7
My forty-five years of experience in legal aid work leads me to similar
conclusions. Like Aviel, rather than guaranteeing all parties an adversarial
attorney, I would pursue court reforms based on transparency (no hard-ball
discovery tactics), collaborative problem solving (no "winners" and "losers"),
and self-help. Parties might benefit from having an advisor who could but need
not be an attorney, but the governing norms would be fairness, safety,
informality, mutuality, and the realities of children's needs and developmental
age. These changes are likely to produce the shorter, cheaper, more personal
results that people desire and are more likely to empower parties to adapt to
changing circumstances on their own, whether by seeking a trusted third-party
advisor or by returning pro se to a problem-solving court.
The lawyer-centric, adversary model may be uniquely disadvantageous for
resolving intrafamily disagreements. However, even if this were the only area
in which nonadversarial modes ought to be the norm, institutional change in
family law is of great practical importance because family troubles draw the
most requests for help from legal services providers. Over the six-year period
from 2006 to 2011, LSC data shows the following: total matters closed varied
in a narrow range from a low of 889,155 in 2008 to a high of 932,406 in 2010.
In all six years, family matters exceeded 300,000-over a third of total case
closings and the single largest case type. In each year, more than two-thirds of
these family matters involved divorce, separation, child custody, or
2230
io6. Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won't Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 21o6 (2013).
107. Id. at 2109-10.
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visitation. 10 If non-adversarial self-help assistance was widely and
conveniently available for this huge swath of cases, access might be
dramatically and cost-effectively increased.
Access has systemic dynamics as well as individual dimensions. The main goal of
the civil Gideon movement is to guarantee representation for each individual
client. This individual focus can lead to a skewed vision -thinking about each
client, lawyer, and case in isolation. However, there are important systemic
dimensions to the provision of counsel. Multiple related cases can be
strategically focused to influence the behavior of agencies,'" creditors,no
landlords, and other local actors."' This kind of strategy involves bringing case
after case raising similar issues. Advice, self-help, and lay advocates, as well as
lawyers, can all play a role. Eventually, after behavior has shifted, limited-
assistance services may be sufficient to police the changed patterns of
operation. Thus, the need for lawyer-intensive service is not constant. It will
vary depending on such factors as the strategic behavior of consumers,
claimants, and their advocates; the effectiveness of public enforcement (such as
inspections or deterrent fines and penalties); better training of agency
representatives and adjudicators; the quality of agency- or court-based self-
help services; and the availability of affordable services from the private bar.
High-level attorney expertise can leverage teams of less expert providers. Another
systemic dimension is the possibility of leveraging high-level and high-cost
attorney expertise with teams of less experienced lawyers, law students, lay
advocates, and unbundled or self-help services. The point is that every complex
or consequential legal problem does not require an attorney, per the civil
Gideon vision. For nearly three decades, I directed a clinical center at Harvard
Law School with a staff heavily weighted to lay advocates, students, and novice
attorneys. In each area of practice, experienced attorneys and paralegals (who
can appear before many administrative agencies) worked with fellows one to
five years out of law school and as many as eighty law students per semester,
lo8. LSC Fact Book, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.1sc.gov/about/sc-fact-books (last visited
Mar. 29, 2013) (providing annual data reports for 20o6-2011 that include tables for "Eligible
Cases Closed by Case Type and Reason for Closure").
og. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Critical Lauyering, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1996) (discussing welfare, labor, and police misconduct strategies).
11o. Mary Spector, From Representation to Research and Back Again: Reflections on Developing an
Empirical Project, 16 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 55 (2012) (discussing abusive collection practices).
inl. Mark. H. Lazerson, In the Halls ofjustice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1 THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN ExPERIENCE 119, 128-35, 148-56 (Richard L. Abel ed.,
1982) (discussing landlord-tenant litigation); Jeanne Charn, Preventing Foreclosure:
Thinking Locally, Investing in Enforcement, Playing for Outcomes (2004) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
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allocated among the substantive practice units. The few expert lawyers and
paralegals were sufficient to support less experienced advocates who handled
the mass of routine matters but who could call in an expert for novel issues or
when an opponent refused settlement on favorable terms." 2
C. An Alternative Approach: Evidence-Based, Self-Help-Centered Services
Earlier in this Essay, I proposed a policy alternative to civil Gideon that
seeks to take advantage of Turner's "once-in-a-generation opportunity ... to
move beyond 1963 solutions to 2012 court problems. . . . Rather than looking
backward to Gideon, Turner invites forward-looking, flexible pro se
alternatives."" 3 In contrast to the lawyer focus of Gideon, I propose a pragmatic
approach that (1) seeks to maximize self-help and similar "lawyer-less" and
"lawyer-lite" services; (2) encourages continued innovation in legal services
delivery; and (3) relies on robust empirical research to comparatively assess
different modes of assistance, gain in-depth understandings of consumer needs
and preferences, and develop a body of evidence about what works best for
whom in what circumstances. The dramatically changed legal services
landscape reflects progress in moving toward these goals, but many challenges
remain.
First, we must encourage continued innovation and experimentation in
legal services delivery. As self-help proponents note: "The danger is that
Turner's minimal suggestions will ossify. . . . [T]he Supreme Court's
suggestions in practice often become not only a constitutional floor, but also a
ceiling. Instead of falling into this pitfall and abandoning experimentation,
lower courts should use Turner as a spur to further innovation."" 4 With
colleagues, I have supported efforts to catalyze experimentation through a
program of competitive grants.' The Legal Services Corporation's
Technology Initiative Grant program is a good model for such an effort. We
have also proposed that appropriately situated law school clinics incorporate
legal services delivery innovation and research as a component of their core
mission."' The Self-Represented Litigation Network is another low-budget,
112. See generally Jeanne Charn, Service and Learning: Reflections on Three Decades of the
Lawyering Process at Harvard Law School, 10 CLINICAL L. REv. 75 (2003).
113. Barton & Bibas, supra, note 59, at 988-89.
114. Id. at 989.
115. Jeffrey Selbin, Josh Rosenthal & Jeanne Charn, Access to Evidence: How an Evidence-Based
Delivery System Can Improve Legal Aid for Low- and Moderate-Income Americans, in CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS, supra note 104, at 51, 53-54, 58-61 (2011).
16. Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Lab Office, 2013 WIs. L. REv. 146.
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big-return model that continues to spur innovation and has the capacity
through its court network to scale up best practices.
A second critical challenge is to develop integrated systems with authority
to strategically target resources, maximize self-help and lawyer-lite services,
assure prompt access to lawyers when consumers need more intensive help,
and scale up proven service approaches. This will require rebalancing legal
services policy making away from local programs and towards authoritative
state or regional policy making centers.
A third challenge is to develop a sustained empirical research capacity that
will provide the evidence base for legal services delivery policies. "' A coalition
that includes researchers, clinicians, bench and bar leaders, and legal services
funders and providers has embarked on this effort and is making progress."
The turn to evidence-based policy will also challenge the bench, bar, legal aid
providers, and funders to engage research results that challenge long-held
views and to relax or change practices and rules that hinder new service
approaches that have proven effective.
A fourth challenge is to reframe the access-to-justice problem in ways that
capture the energy and creativity that continue to fuel the revolutionary
changes in the lower trial courts, the flowering of service innovations in the
legal services and small-firm private bar, and the recent drive to better
understand the public's views and preferences when dealing with law-related
problems. The most basic recasting of the access problem is the shift away
from a lawyer-centered perspective focused mainly on lawyer availability to a
consumer perspective that emphasizes reforming court and administrative
practices, simplifying procedures, and generally making it easier for people to
self-represent or achieve their goals with limited advice or representation.
CONCLUSION: CELEBRATING THE NULL FINDING
I count myself among the advocates of consumer-centered, self-help
services who cheered Turner's holding and celebrated the null findings -that
claimants fared as well on their own as with lawyer assistance -in the random
controlled trials. Self-help, properly supported, is consumer centered and
driven. It suggests that courts and agencies have found ways to encourage and
facilitate self-representation. Claimants may gain confidence in adjudicatory
institutions and be more willing to assert rights enacted for their benefit. Low-
117. Selbin et al., supra note 115, at 58-67 (noting recommendations for an evidence-based legal
services system).
is. Charn & Selbin, supra note 116, at 160-61.
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and middle-income claimants will have many options for assistance and can
make choices that fit their needs and preferences.
While I do not doubt that skilled lawyers will be needed due to inherent
legal complexity, if swaths of problems can be resolved effectively with less or
even no lawyer input, then lawyer services can be triaged where we have
evidence that they are needed and will make a difference. We must keep in
mind that access to courts and lawyers is not identical to access to justice.
Courts and lawyers play an important role but the complexities and obscurities
of the legal system can inhibit as well as advance goals of fairness and equity.
The ideal of an informed and self-empowered public effectively pursuing their
legal entitlements in institutions that welcome them also has great appeal but
will not fit every circumstance. Which point along the spectrum from expert
lawyers to advice for self-helpers best meets the needs of individual consumers
is best addressed by review of data, empirical research, consumer surveys and
cost-benefit analysis - the tools of public policy analysis. Normative issues
remain (should society subsidize claims worth less than the costs of service)
but policy tools advance debates about the marginal case by documenting
potential second and third order effects of success on primary claims. Evidence
based strategies offer promise of more generous, effective and consumer
centered access to the legal system.
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